A continuously-updated reference of every country with active restrictions on Chinese-manufactured surveillance cameras. Built and maintained by Adiance Technologies, a BIS-registered (R-72003735) NDAA-compliant OEM/ODM camera manufacturer in India.
Scope: Federal agencies, federal contractors, federally-funded organisations.
Section 889 of the John S. McCain NDAA prohibits US federal agencies and their contractors from procuring or using telecommunications and video surveillance equipment from named Chinese manufacturers. Extended to grantees in 2020. State-level follow-on legislation in TX, FL, GA, LA, AR, VT, CT.
Official source →Scope: Sensitive government sites and core procurement.
Cabinet Office instructed all government departments to stop deploying Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment on sensitive sites and to remove existing equipment where feasible. Procurement Act 2023 codified supplier-exclusion grounds covering supply-chain risk.
Official source →Scope: Federal departments, defense, critical infrastructure operators.
Following a Senate audit, the federal government ordered removal of Chinese-manufactured cameras from Defence and DFAT sites. State governments and several universities followed. Security of Critical Infrastructure Act compliance obligations extend supply-chain scrutiny to telecom, energy, water and transport.
Official source →Scope: Central government, defense, sensitive ministries.
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry restricted Chinese surveillance equipment in government procurement, aligned with US export-control measures. Japan was the first major Western-aligned economy to formalize procurement restrictions.
Official source →Scope: Federal departments, Crown corporations.
Following the US lead, Canadian federal departments began removing Chinese-manufactured cameras from federal facilities. Procurement Canada applies enhanced supply-chain scrutiny.
Official source →Scope: Government agencies following Australian lead.
Within days of Australia's announcement, New Zealand's GCSB and government agencies initiated audits and removal of Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment from government premises.
Official source →Scope: Government and critical infrastructure.
Lithuania's National Cyber Security Centre issued warnings against Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment for government deployments, followed by removal directives from defence and central government installations.
Official source →Scope: Defence and government.
Following Lithuanian guidance and broader Baltic security cooperation, Latvia restricted Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment in defence and central government settings.
Scope: Defence and government.
Estonia joined Baltic neighbours in restricting Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment in defence and central government settings.
Scope: Government, defence, critical infrastructure.
Taiwan's Executive Yuan banned Chinese-manufactured information and surveillance equipment from government procurement, aligned with broader supply-chain de-risking.
Scope: Central government, defence, public-sector undertakings.
Indian Ministry of Electronics and IT requires STQC / BIS ER-01 certification for all network cameras sold in India from April 2025. Public Procurement (Preference to Make in India) Order favours domestic manufacturers.
Official source →Scope: Pending — focused on government and critical infrastructure.
Dutch parliament held debates on Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment in government deployments. Ministry of Defence has begun removal at sensitive sites. Broader legislation under consideration.
Scope: Pending — BSI guidance for critical infrastructure.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) actively evaluating Chinese surveillance equipment. The 2023 IT Security Act framework provides legal basis for component-level restrictions.
Scope: Pending — critical infrastructure focus.
ANSSI (Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information) provides ongoing guidance against Chinese-manufactured surveillance equipment for critical infrastructure. No formal federal ban yet.
Scope: Pending — strategic sectors via Golden Power oversight.
Italy's Golden Power regulatory framework provides mechanism for case-by-case review of Chinese surveillance procurement in strategic sectors.
Scope: Pan-EU framework affecting all connected devices including cameras.
EU Cyber Resilience Act imposes security obligations on connected devices including cameras. EU AI Act regulates biometric surveillance specifically. Both create de-facto compliance pressure on Chinese supply chains across EU member states.
Official source →The trajectory is one-directional. Restrictions started with US federal NDAA in 2019. Within six years, every Five Eyes economy, both Baltics' close partners, and India have implemented restrictions. Active debates in the Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy point to continued expansion across the EU through 2026–2028.
For distributors, integrators, telecoms and brands whose customers are based in any of the 11 jurisdictions with active restrictions — or any of the 4 jurisdictions on watch — supply-chain compliance is no longer optional. Buyers and resellers shifting to non-Chinese supply now capture both the current restricted-procurement market and the future expansion as more jurisdictions follow.
Request a Compliant SampleCheck Your Current Camera →This map is compiled from official government sources, parliamentary records and primary regulatory documents. Each country entry links to its official source where available. Status categories are normalized across jurisdictions for comparison.
Last updated: June 2026. Next scheduled update: October 2026.
Spotted a restriction we missed, or an entry that needs correcting? Email sales@adiance.com with the source and we will review and update.